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Can Regulation Fair Disclosure Survive the
Aftermath of Enron?
In December of 2001, the story of Enron Corporation's implosion
swept the news as the largest corporate bankruptcy ever.' Enron, a
Houston-based energy commodities trading company and, at the
time, the seventh largest company in the U.S., collapsed after its
stock price plummeted and credit rating sank as a result of
complex financial cover-up schemes generated by its top
management. 2 Massive debt, shown only on its subsidiary
partnerships' books, was visible only to investors in the
partnership, and not to Enron's public investors.3 Investors
lost over $60 billion, and Enron's employees, misled by the
company's executives, were stripped of their retirement savings.4 As
a result, the Justice Department, the Labor Department, multiple
congressional committees, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") are investigating into just what went wrong
and how.5 One of the greatest corporate scandals has shed new
light on the need for investors to receive accurate information at
an appropriate time so that the public is adequately protected in
the event of another corporate debacle.
This comment will explore the requirements of Regulation Fair
Disclosure ("FD") and the trends and market conditions that
necessitated its promulgation. Its impositions on market analysts
and issuers alike will prove minimal in comparison to the positive
implications the regulation should, in theory, yield to investors. A
realistic analysis will examine the practicalities of FD: can the
regulation actually work to bring individual investors material
information? Finally, this comment will discuss the effectiveness of
the regulation in the aftermath of Enron's c ollapse, and the
certainty of FD's future.

1. Thi Nguyen, Investors Impatient with Corporate Debt, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 25, 2001,
at C3.
2. ABC News: This Week (ABC television broadcast, Jan. 13, 2002). See The SEC
Recommends Improvements to Regulation FD, MANAGING THE GENERAL LEDGER, (Institute of

Management & Administration, Feb. 1, 2002), available at 2002 WL 7354714.
3. Diana B. Hendriques with Kurt Eichenwald, A Fog Over Enron, And the Legal
Landscape, N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 27, 2002, at section 3.
4. ABCNews: This Week, supra note 2.
5.

Id.
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I. FD FUNDAMENTALS
The average American's recent increased access to the Internet
and other high-speed technology has revolutionized the American
culture, including the economy.6 More Americans, due to the
popularity and affordability of home computers having access to
the Internet, and through such access receiving abundant
7
information, arguably caused the bull market of the late 1990's.
Individuals became more willing to invest in the stock market
because of the availability of information and ease in researching
their investments. 8 However, until October 2000, it seemed that the
proliferation of individual investors had not altered companies'
approaches to disseminating material information, important to all
investors, to only analysts and large market players, leaving the
individual, small investor at a disadvantage. 9 To protect the general
investing public, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted
Regulation Fair Disclosure.10
6. Between 1998 and 2000 in every region across the country, the share of households
with internet access increased significantly, especially in the Pacific, New England, and
Mountain states. Households' Internet Access Grows Across the U.S., WALL ST. J., Aug. 15,
2001, at B14. Discounted sign-up rates for internet service, higher education levels, and the
ease of "staying in touch" from remote areas fueled increased household internet usage to a
national average of 41.5%. Id.
7. Half of the households in the United States own equities. Christopher H. Schmitt, A
Handicapper's Guide to the New SEC Chief, Bus. WK, May 21, 2001, at 40.
8. See Danny Hakim, SEC Approves Regulation Against Selective Disclosure, N.Y.
TwiEs, Aug. 11, 2000, at C8 (stating that "[olver the last few years, online trading, financial
message boards and the rapid-fire dissemination of news from Web sites have helped close
the gap between average investors and Wall Street"). See also Sara Hansard, At Hearing,
Industry Cries Foul Over Fair Disclosure: Companies, Analysts Join in Criticism,
INvEsTMENT NEWS, May 28, 2001, at 8.
9. "The democratization of investing has also exposed investors to an array of abuses
as Wall Street's second-class players." Schmitt, supra note 7.
10. Regulation Fair Disclosure, known as Regulation FD, was adopted as a final rule by
the Securities and Exchange Commission to take effect on October 23, 2000. Selective
Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 43154 (Aug. 15, 2000). The general
rule concerns selective disclosure, which refers to the circulation of material information to
analysts, institutional investors, and other major market participants and not to the general
public; thus, the crux of Regulation FD states:
(a) Whenever an issuer, or any person acting on its behalf, discloses any material
nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its securities to any person described
in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, the issuer shall make public disclosure of that
information as provided in § 243.101(e):
(1) Simultaneously, in the case of an intentional disclosure; and
(2) Promptly, in the case of a non-intentional disclosure.
(b)(1) Except as provided in (b)(2) of this section, paragraph (a) of this section shall
apply to a disclosure made to any person outside the issuer
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Basically, Regulation FD requires issuers," that is, companies
registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that have
securities outstanding in the secondary market, to publicly
3
disseminate, 2 via oral or written statements, any intentionally1
(i)

(ii)

(iii)

Who is a broker or dealer, or a person associated with a broker or
dealer as those terms are defined in Section 3(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78c (a));
Who is an investment adviser, as that term is defined in Section
202(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-2(a)(11)); an institutional investment manager, as that term is
defined in Section 13(f)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C. § 78m (f)(5)), that filed a report on Form 13F (17 C.FR. 249.325)
with the Commission for the most recent quarter ended prior to the date
of the disclosure; or a person associated with either the foregoing ....
Who is an investment company, as defined in section 3 of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. § 80a-3), or who would be
an investment company but for Section 3(c)(1) (15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1))
or Section 3(c)(7) (15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7)) thereof, or an affiliated
person of either of the foregoing ...

(iv)

; or

Who is a holder of the issuer's securities under circumstances in which
it is reasonably foreseeable that the person will purchase or sell the
issuer's securities on the basis of the information.
(2) Paragraph (a) of this section shall not apply to a disclosure made:
(i)
To a person who owes a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer (such
as an attorney, investment banker, or accountant);
(ii)
To a person who expressly agrees to maintain the disclosed information
in confidence;
(iii) To an entity whose primary business is the issuance of credit ratings,
provided the information is disclosed solely for the purpose of
developing a credit rating and the entity's ratings are publicly available;
or
(iv)
In connection with a securities offering registered under the Securities
Act ....
Regulation FD, General Rule of Selective Disclosure, 17 C.FR. § 243.100 (2000).
11. See Regulation FD, Definitions, 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(b) (2000).
12. Generally, placing the material information in a publicly filed document, such as a
Form 8-K, Form 10-Q, or proxy statement constitutes sufficient disclosure, as long as the
information is not buried within the document nor disclosed in a piecemeal fashion. SEC
Division of Corporation Finance, Manual of Publicly Available Telephone Interpretations,
Fourth Supplement (including interpretations issued in May 2001) available at http://
www.sec.govfmterps/telephone/phonesupplement4.htm (last visited Aug. 13, 2001). Also, an
issuer can make a public disclosure via a conference call, provided that adequate advance
notice, that is, a reasonable time, is given, containing the date, time, and call-in information
for the call, and a transcript or replay of the call is accessible after the call takes place. Id.
Though a press release circulated through a widely-used news or wire service will most
likely satisfy FD's requirement, however, a mere posting on the issuer's website disclosing
the material information will probably be insufficient. Exchange Act Release No. 43154 at 16.
The SEC intentionally drafted Regulation FD so as to furnish issuers with flexibility in the
method of disclosure they choose to employ: "[any] method (or combination of methods) of
disclosure that is reasonably designed to provide broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the
information to the public" is sufficient under the rule. Id. at 14 (quoting 17 C.YR.
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disclosed material nonpublic information 4 simultaneously to the
public and any market insider. 15 Any non-intentional disclosure of
material nonpublic information that the issuer makes must be
promptly disseminated to the general public. 16 In essence,
Regulation FD curbs any closed discussions between issuers and
market analysts seeking guidance regarding pricing trends, earnings
7
forecasts, or other facts that an investor would consider material.
§ 243.101(e)). Nonetheless, the SEC will consider-all the relevant facts and circumstances,
including the issuer's usual method of disclosure, to determine the reasonableness of the
distribution, during an enforcement action. Id. at 16.
13. See supra note 10. A disclosure is intentional when the person making the
disclosure knows, or is reckless in not knowing, that the information communicated is both
material and nonpublic. 17 C.YR. § 243.101(a).
14. The standard for materiality is that which is typically used under the federal
securities laws, as defined by the United States Supreme Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). Information is material if a substantial likelihood
exists that a reasonable investor would have viewed the disclosure of the omitted fact to
significantly alter "the 'total mix' of information made available," or, in other words, the
information would have been considered important in making the investment decision. Id.
See also Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (adopting the TSC Industries
definition of materiality in the Rule 10b-5 context). The SEC also relies on the materiality
concept discussed in its Staff Accounting Bulletin 99 ("SAB99"). Though SAB99 apparently
explains materiality with respect to financial statements, qualitative and quantitative factors,
including the anticipated market reaction, should be considered in assessing the materiality
of information for Regulation FD. Paul D. Tosetti, The SEC's Regulation FD - Fair
Disclosure, in CoRPoRATE LAw, at 152 (PLI Corp. Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 1259,
2001). See also SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 (Aug. 12, 1999) (amending 17 C.YR. pt.
211B).
Nonpublic information is that which has not been disseminated in a manner making it
available to investors generally. Exchange Act Release No. 43154 at 9.
15. See supra note 10.
16. See supra note 10. "Promptly" means as soon as is reasonably practicable, but not
after the later of 24 hours or the start of the next day's trading on the New York Stock
Exchange, after a senior official of the issuer learns of the non-intentional disclosure, made
by or on behalf of the issuer, of information known, or reckless if not known, to be both
material and nonpublic. 17 C.FR. § 243.101(d).
17. In the adopting release, the SEC listed seven major events providing nonpublic
information that "should be reviewed carefully to determine whether they are material":
(1) earnings information; (2) mergers, acquisitions, tender offers, joint ventures, or
changes in assets; (3) new products or discoveries, or developments regarding
customers or suppliers; (4) changes in control or in management; (5) change in
auditors or auditor notification that the issuer may no longer rely on an auditor's
report; (6) events regarding the issuer's redemption, repurchase plans, stock splits or
changes in dividends, changes to the rights of security holders, public or private sales
of additional securities; and (7) bankruptcies or receiverships.
Exchange Act Release No. 43154 at 10.
But most importantly, what may be material to one company may not be material to
another, depending on its size or industry, for example, so materiality remains a fact-based,
company-specific standard with no bright-line rule. The Director of the SEC's Division of
Enforcement asserted in a speech that a company should begin its materiality assessment by
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The SEC adopted Regulation FD "to level the playing field" in the
secondary markets by providing individual investors with the same
access to information that companies had given directly to market
insiders.18 Believing that an issuer's selective disclosure can
compromise the market's integrity, the SEC wanted to enhance
investors' confidence in the capital markets by reducing any
incentive that analysts may have in reporting favorably about a
company merely as a means to ensure continued access to the
unique, selectively disclosed information from the reported
company. 19
Most significantly, the SEC reasoned that broad access to
information technologies mandates full and fair disclosure by
public companies.20
Specifically, Internet webcasting
and
teleconferencing, specifically, provide real time dissemination of
market information, 21 thereby diminishing the customary functional
role of analysts as intermediaries. 22 Though one could argue that a
asking three questions: (1) Where is the company in its earnings cycle? (2) How much time
has passed since the public guidance was given? (3) Has any event occurred between the
release of the initial estimate and the confirmation that would probably cause a reasonable
investor to question the accuracy of the initial estimate? Richard H. Walker, Regulation FD
- An Enforcement Perspective, Address to the Compliance & Legal Division of the
Securities Industry Association (November 1, 2000) in CORPORATE LAW, at 515 (PL1 Corp.
Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 1250, 2001).
18. Exchange Act Release No. 43154 at 2. For example, the SEC notes that market
insiders, who are privy to information from a company, such as advance negative earnings
results, were able to "make a profit or avoid a loss at the expense of those kept in the dark."
Id. A more succinct explanation comments, "[tihere used to be a divine order to the stock
market. Analysts would hear a company's earnings forecast first, then the forecast would
filter down to their clients - and last, to the public at large." Christian Murray, Leveling the
Playing Field on The Street/ SEC Rule Seen as More Democratic, But Some Say It Causes
Volatility, NEWSDAY, June 16,'2001, at A16.
19. Exchange Act Release No. 43154 at 2. A possible conflict of interest could arise for
an analyst in the temptation to publish favorable recommendations about issuers with which
he has a close relationship, for the purpose of having sustained access to the selectively
disclosed information; an objective and accurate analysis is therefore compromised. Id. at 3.
Remarking positively about possible effects of the regulation, a law professor stated, "the
principal benefit of this will be to enforce the independence and objectivity of the securities
analyst." Hakim, supra note 8. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text discussing
Merrill Lynch & Co.
20. Exchange Act Release No. 43154 at 3. The extensive "information superhighway"
has created the demand and expectation of enabling online investors to perform the same
research that market professionals previously had done exclusively. Id.
21. See supra note 8.
22. See id. Investors now can credit their own research to be as current and accurate
as that which any analyst will receive. See Jeff D. Opdyke, The Big Chill: Street Feels Effect
of 'FairDisclosure'Rule, WAU ST. J., Oct. 23, 2000, at Cl (discussing Regulation FD's chilling
effect on contacts between analysts and corporate managers). Indicatively, an analyst
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lesser need for intermediaries indicates the belief that individual
investors are savvy enough to analyze market information on their
own,2 3 perhaps the better contention is that the access to
technology advanced the economic growth as evidenced in the
capital markets, and in turn entitles individual, self-directed
investors to the same quality and ease of information that analysts
enjoy. Regardless, the effect of FD on issuers, so far, is mixed:
some companies are abiding by the provisions of the regulation,
and others choose to test the regulation's limits. And for the
investing public? Regulation FD may not be the answer.
II.

THE "DUMBING DowN" OF WALL STREET

Now that Regulation FD requires issuers to cater their
disclosures to both analysts and average investors, who may be
unfamiliar with Wall Street jargon, companies have changed the
way they disseminate information by "lay[ing] out a road map that
analysts and investors can follow." 24 But the increased and now
modified mode of corporate communication that FD requires
evidences something more disturbing: the inferior view that many
on Wall Street have of average American investors. Insiders
complain that the regulation has "dumbed down" the level of
corporate publicized communications because the general public
has become privy to the same information, which requires the
information to be presented in a way that the public can
understand. 25 Some perceive a change in the issuers' manner of
communication that tends to be "more superficial and less
informative," when speaking to a general audience. 26 A more biting
comment by Fidelity Investments snarled that Regulation FD "drags
smart mutual-fund analysts down to the level of the masses because
grumbled that the regulation has made unattainable particular pieces of information which
previously came from corporate executives directly, in that "[with] few places [he] can go to
gather data on internal operations... his analysis now reflects 'more judgment calls ....'"
Id. However, a dichotomy will still exist between the reasonable investor, and a
sophisticated investor or analyst, who with persistence, knowledge, and insight combined,
can piece together particular information that may seem insignificant to the reasonable, or
average investor, to reach a conclusion that the information is material. Tosetti, supra note
14, at 153.
23. See infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text reviewing the current state of
investor financial literacy.
24. William C. Smith, Tell-All Rules, AB.A J., Apr. 2001, at 63 (quoting Daniel Kaufman,
in-house counsel, Zany Brainy, Inc.).
25. Id. at 63-64.
26. Id. at 64.
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they can no longer ask in private the thoughtful questions that give
them an edge." 27 This defensive mentality was also displayed in a
conversation between a market commentator and the hostess of
CNBC's Squawk Box:
BARTIROMO (hostess): Give us again the impact that you
think Reg. FD has had on investors.
CRAMER (TheStreet.com Markets Commentator): If you do
a lot of homework ... [iun the old days, you . . . could go to
In the
the CFO of [a company]. You could call [him] up ....
old days, the CFO would say, 'Well . . . I understand you did
some homework and now let me give you the other side of
the story .... Now the CFO says 'what... are you asking me
this for? You know I'm not allowed to answer questions like
that. No homework questions please.'
BARTIROMO: But that's for you. You are a market
professional. You can call-pick up the phone and call the CFO.
CRAMER: Oh, so we should all be stupid? We should all be
dumb?
BARTIROMO: But individual investors cannot.
CRAMER: Where in the Constitution is the right to be
stupid?
BARTIROMO: It's not being stupid. Individual investors have
the right to get the information at the same time that the Jim
Cramers of the world have it.
CRAMER: [I]ndividual investors are like people who go to a
ball game, OK? There are professionals who can hit and there
are amateurs who are in the stands. And I accept that
distinction. [W]here is the place where we all are able to hit
the 400 ball? It's not the case. Right now, professionals are not
able to do any homework and see any reward for it ....
BARTIROMO: They can still do their homework. They can
go around the CFO. They can do their own checks . . . and
then they can make their own decision about buying stock
based on their homework .... 28
Despite any ignoble perception of small investors, analysts and
institutional investors, as critics of Regulation FD, allege that
issuers are releasing information of declining quality into the
27. Jeff D. Opdyke & Michael Schroeder, DisclosureRule Gets a Bad Rap, WALL ST. J.,
June 5, 2001, at C1 (emphasis added).
28. Squawk Box, 8:00 am (CNBC television broadcast, Aug. 27, 2001) [hereinafter
Squawk Box] (emphasis added).
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market, thereby creating the potential for greater stock price
volatility.29 Interestingly enough, however, a recent study contends
that the enhanced flow of information to investors, required by FD,
has caused reactions to earnings news to be less volatile.30 In fact,
the study suggests that some improvement has resulted in the
quality and quantity of financial information that companies have
released prior to earnings announcements. 31 So are analysts'
worries justified?
III.

ANALYSTS: DOWN AND OUT?

Analysts argue that the implementation of Regulation FD
diminishes their importance in the market.3 2 However, analysts
have the ability, unlike average market players, to piece together
tidbits of information to arrive at a material conclusion.33 Even
though analysts' jobs have become more difficult as a result of
Regulation FD,14 most corporate executives in the industry believe
29. Phyllis Plitch, Dire Effects of Disclosure Rule Doubted, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2001, at
C14. Contrary to critics' assertions, since Regulation FD's effective date of October 23, 2000,
market volatility has apparently decreased. Editorials, Don't Roll Back FairDisclosure, Bus.
Wt, Aug. 13, 2001, at 124.
30. Plitch, supra note 29, at C14.
31. Regulation FD Does Not Harm Markets, Says USC Report, Bus. WIRE, July 23, 2001.
In a USC-Purdue study that sampled 1, 595 companies, evidence revealed a minor decrease
in return volatility (measuring the percent change in stock prices) around the time of
earnings announcements since the implementation of Regulation FD. Id. Additionally, the
fact that a company's stock price more quickly converges to its post-announcement level
indicates that the quality of information that the market receives has improved. Id. Notably,
the study found that the number of voluntary earnings disclosures by managers has doubled
since FD became effective. Id.
32. See supra note 22. Lauren Rudd, Do Your Homework And You Won't Need
Analysts, PrrrsBURGH PosT-GAzErrE, Apr. 14, 2002, at C4 (stating that the goal of the column
was to aid readers in doing their own investment research to minimize dependence on
analysts' reports, shown to be less credible due to the recent investment rating scandal at
Merrill Lynch).
33. This practice is known as using the "mosaic" theory, where issuers selectively
disclose to analysts nonpublic, immaterial information. Tosetti, supra note 14, at 153.
34. Gary McWilliams, Sign of the Times, WM.L ST. J., Aug. 9, 2001, at Cl. See Reg FD
Fools, More Reg FD Jokes, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2001, at C16 (noting that analysts can no
longer rely on one-on-one meetings but have to trust the company's financial statements, and
quoting a director of research at Morgan Stanley who said: "How do we train the next
generation of analysts?"). (But can analysts trust a company's financial statements? See infra
notes 88-91, 98-99 and accompanying text.) Analysts' loathe of the regulation is exposed in
this recent conversation condemning the rule:
CRAMER (TheStreet.com Markets Commentator): [I] don't think that Reg FD is
making anybody smarter. I think it's just making it more difficult. [Ejxecutives are
using this to hide behind and not be able to find facts ....
FABER (CNBC reporter): [Y]ou raised the case of an aggressive analyst and/or
investor, but what about those who are completely lazy or simply relying on these
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that the "best" analysts are digging deeper into the fundamental
research, and spending less time on earnings forecasts.35 To the
layman, it seems that Regulation FD has compelled an important
change via an unintended side effect. Not only does the nile
provide everyone with the same access to corporate data, but it
also (unintentionally?) requires analysts to refocus their research
away from reliance on personal or professional relationships with
corporate leaders to the basics of corporate structure and
performance. Essentially, FD commands improved integrity on the
part of market insiders.
IV.

CORPORATE DEFIANCE IN NONCOMPLIANCE

Importantly, Regulation FD infiltrates the "old boys" network of
trading favors and giving key information to select individuals.36
Now, for instance, any inadvertent comments about earnings that a
corporate executive, such as a CEO, makes during a golf game with
a significant investor must be promptly disclosed.3 7 The symbiotic
relationship of handholding, via wink or nod,3 between favored
analysts and corporate executives has changed, and some
companies have "clammed up," becoming more conservative in
their communications. 39 However, like analysts, not all issuers have
yet adapted to, or, more likely approved of, the new rule. In the
summer of 2001, Compaq Computer Corporation scheduled a
closed-door meeting with analysts and institutional investors to
companies to offer them guidance and doing no homework whatsoever?
BARTIROMO: The individual is getting left behind because you are able to pick up the
phone. You had dinner with the CFO last week. 'Let me call him right now and see,
after that big dinner that we had last night together or that golf game we had. Let me
call him right now.'
CRAMER: [T]here was nothing the matter with the game the way it was played ....
[Blecause I think this FD's a joke ....
Everybody in the business knows that FD's a
joke.
Squawk Box, supra note 28 (emphasis added).
35. Top Executives Say "Best"Analysts Focus More on Fundamentals Than Forecasts,
Bus. WIRE, Aug. 14, 2001.
36. Invitation-only conferences where exclusive, fmancial details of a company's
performance were disclosed are no longer permitted. Editorials, supra note 29, at 124.
Furthermore, the "whispering game," in which companies leaked information to analysts,
giving low expectations so that actual earnings would surpass the low numbers and cause
their stock price to soar, has been quelled by the regulation. Id.
37. Smith, supra note 24, at 62. See also Reg FD Fools, supra note 34.
38. Some CFO's have admitted steering analysts in the "right direction" by using certain
body language to convey information, because body language will not appear in a transcript.
Geoffrey Colvin, Just Say No to Guidance, FORTUNE, Apr. 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL
2190477.
39. Opdyke, supra note 22.
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discuss a plan for its computer services business. 4° Although
Compaq broadcast the meeting over the Internet to satisfy the
simultaneous disclosure requirement of FD, the company released
scant details about the logistics of the meeting. 41 In fact, a Compaq
spokesperson declared: "It's a meeting specifically designed for the
analysts, and not something we're making public . . . . It's got a
very narrow audience." 42 In another instance of defiance, Raytheon
Company provided detailed private briefings regarding its first
quarter outlook to analysts after its annual investor conference had
been carried via the Internet." Afterwards, analysts' first quarter
earnings estimates for Raytheon fell by approximately five cents,
which change was attributed to conversations with the company's
management."
Regardless of any SEC attempt to regulate corporate behavior to
the benefit of the average investor, many companies will inevitably
find a way to skirt the rule requirements and push the limits of the
system.45 For example, issuers play a new game of "preannouncing"
low-balled earnings, so that when the actual earnings report is
released, investors will be surprised by the extra few cents per
share that the company actually earned.46 Though Regulation FD
obligates issuers to make these disclosures public, the rule does
not prohibit disclosures that undoubtedly still attempt to keep the
small investors a bit off track.

40.
41.
42.
43.
Mar. 15,
44.

McWflliams, supra note 34.
Id.
Id.
Michael Schroeder, Raytheon's Disclosure to Analysts is Investigated, WALL ST. J.,
2001.
Id.

45. Hopefully, issuers will reconsiders such a strategy because of the current increased
public skepticism and SEC scrutiny of disclosure practices, prompted by the Enron fiasco.
46. Editorials, supra note 29.
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THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF MARKET INFORMATION

Regulation FD was the brainchild of former SEC Chairman
Arthur Levitt, who displayed his democratic suasion by attempting
to help the individual investor access the information, in a timely
manner, important to his investments. To some, Levitt was the
"most pro-consumer head of the SEC in its history," who
47
encouraged regulations for the protection of ordinary investors.
Pedagogically, or rather, paternally, Levitt advised the public to
avoid shaky investments by first becoming educated about the risk:
You have access to financial news, stock quotes and pricing
information, to corporate filings and financial disclosure . . .
[You] are
[and can] sift through the facts in plain English ....
now privy to the same information, at the same time, as
analysts, investment bankers and every other professional on
Wall Street. 4s
Levitt's philosophy behind Regulation FD, to level the playing
field, is illustrated by his view that a "franchise" relationship exists
between analysts and investment bankers. 49 Ideally, Levitt wanted
the regulation to: (1) strip analysts of all incentives for talking up
companies that their investment firm does business with (or whose
securities it owns); and (2) curtail issuers and investment bankers
from applying pressure to analysts for positive reports. 5° Before the
47. Smith, supra note 24 (quoting Jeffrey L. Kodroff, plaintiffs' counsel, Spector,
Roseman & Kodroff).
48. Id. (quoting Arthur Levitt, The Future for America's Investors: Their Rights and
Obligations, Address in Philadelphia (Jan. 16, 2001)). Levitt more specifically described his
sentiment and rationale for Regulation FD:
In a democracy that prizes the initiative and promise of the individual, it's not enough
to talk about your rights, but also your obligations. As an investor, you certainly have
the right to be treated fairly, to get straight answers to straight questions, to know
what you are buying and what you are paying for it. But as an investor, you also have
an obligation to ask questions - many questions - to seek out information, and
contemplate your own tolerance for risk.
Id. See infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text (discussing investor education), and Rudd,
supra note 32 (advising individuals to invest in companies they know).
49. Karen Talley, Levitt Expects Wall Street to Fall Short, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2001, at
C13 (commenting that the ethical wall between analysts who follow stocks, and the
investment bankers who hold those stocks and court the issuers of the stocks, is weak, and
that a separation between analysts and investment bankers should exist). See also Dan Fost,
Stung by Enron, Business Journalists Increase Their Vigilance, THE SAN FRANcisco
CHRoNICLE, March 3, 2002, available at 2002 WL 4014449 (explaining that a conflict of
interest exists for analysts because their employers have a banking relationship with the
companies they cover).
50. Talley, supra note 49.
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rule's implementation, it was not uncommon for promises of
positive coverage to be traded for new business. 51 Unfortunately,
Levitt is not hopeful (and may ultimately be proven correct 2) that
Regulatiorn FD will prevent the investment bankers from holding
the stocks they praise.5 Compromised analyst objectivity spurred
the adoption of this rule to allow the ordinary investor to judge for
himself the impact of any disclosed information. The purpose of FD
is evident in issuers' grumbles, to which Levitt has responded: "We
have heard from corporate executives who lament being unable to
do certain things because of Fair Disclosure . . . . They never
should have been doing those things [anyway]."M
At least pre-Enron, the implementation of Regulation FD had
actually provided individual investors with at least the perception
of greater fairness in our capital markets.5 5 However, insofar as
"professional investors on Wall Street have increasingly tried to
create private markets of information to benefit themselves and
their firms,"5 unfortunately, it seems that such efforts have
succeeded. 7 The New York State Attorney General discovered the
analysts of Merrill Lynch & Co. to have biasedly rated Internet
stocks to win new business, instead of protecting their investor
clients.-s Merrill Lynch analysts are accused of giving the highest
investment ratings to Internet stocks, labeled internally at the firm
as "falling apart" or "piece[s] of crap." 59 Remarkably, this is the
kind of behavior that Levitt sought to prevent. 6°
VI.

THE LIABILITY DETERRENCE

Concerns have arisen that Regulation FD will be frequently
51. Id.
52. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (discussing Merrill Lynch's recent
troubles with compromised analyst objectivity and disclosure practices).
53. Id.
54. Floyd Norris, Levitt to Leave SEC Early; Bush to Pick 4, N.Y. TiMS, Dec. 21, 2000,
at C1.
55. Hansard, supra note 8 (remarking about a Securities Industry Association study).
56. Id. (quoting Tom Gardner, founder of Motley Fool, Inc.).
57. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text and infra notes 58-59, 98-99 and
accompanying text (mentioning the recent disclosure scandals).
58. Charles Gasparino, Merrill Lynch Told Analysts to Change Ways, WALL ST. J., Apr.
9, 2002, at C1.
59. Rudd, supra note 32, at C4. As New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer,
investigating the matter, declared, "there was a general notion that everyone know what was
going on, except the small investors." Charles Gasparino, Wall Street Has an Unlikely New
Cop: Spitzer, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2002, at Cl, C3.
60. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
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enforced against issuers, in turn subjecting them to immense
liability to shareholders. Though Regulation FD gives no private
cause of action and can only be enforced by the SEC, 61 issuers
have become more careful in wording their disclosures, so as not
to be proven inaccurate in the future, and to prevent any liability
from misleading the public as a consequence of the disclosure. 62 As
an attorney for an issuer stated, "[wlhen you know that the
plaintiff's bar [may be] on the phone, and people who may sue you,
it makes you more cautious in giving guidance."6 On the other
hand, as proponents of the regulation contend, "[w]hat happened
before consumers and lawyers were listening in on conference
calls?"14 Wary plaintiffs' lawyers have doubted whether only
government enforcement of the rule, without the added threat of
private shareholder lawsuits, will be enough to impede any leaks by
issuers to analysts of material information.6 Nevertheless, a
consensus exists among companies that no issuer would like to be
the guinea pig for the SEC's enforcement of the rule.6 6 However,
the SEC's first violation inquiry under the regulation was
necessitated by Raytheon's private briefings to analysts regarding
its first quarter earnings. 67 Additionally, Motorola Corporation's
revenue and earnings guidance to analysts is also subject to
possible SEC enforcement action.6 As an example of a proper way
to conform to FD's requirements, though Campbell Soup Company
61. In its Adopting Release, the SEC discusses liability under Regulation Fl):
It is not an anti-fraud rule, and it is not designed to create new duties under the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws or in private rights of action ....
The provision makes clear that Regulation FD does not create a new duty for
purposes of lOb-5 liability. Accordingly, private plaintiffs cannot rely on an issuer's
violation of Regulation FD as a basis for a private action alleging lOb-5 violations.
Exchange Act Release No. 43154 at 20.
Furthermore, when the SEC does pursue an issuer for violations of the rule, it can bring
an administrative action seeking a cease-and-desist order, or a civil action seeking an
injunction and/or monetary penalties. Id. at 20. Also, the SEC can bring an enforcement
action against an individual (who was a representative of the issuer) who violated the rule,
either as "a cause of" violation in a cease-and-desist action, or in an injunction action as an
alder/abettor of the violation, Id.
62. Murray, supra note 18. Presently, this point is ever so crucial, again, thanks to
Enron.
63. Smith, supra note 24, at 64 (quoting Steve Poss, Chair of Corporate Governance
and Securities Litigation, Goodwin Procter).
64. Id. (quoting Jeffrey L Kodroff, plaintiffs' counsel, Spector, Roseman & Kodroff).
65. Id.
66. Jeff D. Opdyke, Wall Street, SEC Discuss 'Reg FD' at Roundtable, WALL ST. J., Apr.
25, 2001.
67. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
68. Schroeder, supra note 43.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 40:695

continues holding one-on-one analyst meetings, the company
provides only long-term guidance and will not answer privately
asked questions designed to elicit specific, short-term numbers.6 9
Corporate anxiety can yield to paranoia; therefore, issuers are
acting cautiously and taking a "wait-and-see" approach to gauge the
severity of the enforcement action against the first offender of the
regulation.7 0
VII.

REGULATION

FD: A

GOOD IDEA WITH A FLAWED RESULT

Regulation FD theoretically provides the individual investor with
the ability to access material information contemporaneously with
analysts and other insiders. The democratization of capital market
information energized the economy as well as the layman's
enthusiasm in investing in the stock market, that is, until Enron
Corporation collapsed. Thus, the initial criticism of the regulation
by market analysts and corporate executives was not proven true.
The number of corporate communications augmented rather than
decreased, 71 and the quality of information released by corporate
executives to the public improved, instead of corporations
"clamming up" and releasing scant details. 72 For example, the CEO's
of USA Networks and Gillette Company followed a "more data, less
guidance" theory and abandoned selective disclosure to analysts;
nothing happened to their stocks - analysts didn't talk the stock
down, and investors didn't sell. 73 Moreover, the rule still fulfills an
important function of "leveling the playing field." The new
economy, represented by the Internet's online trading and discount
brokers, self-directed pension plans, exchange-traded funds, and
lower fee-based businesses, would have been unable to thrive in a
market favoring the selective disclosure to analysts. 74 As a result of
the online innovations, the market has become more efficient.
Therefore, "it's ludicrous to believe that insiders should be allowed
to continue to get first crack at materially important information
69. Opdyke & Schroeder, supra note 27.
70. Id. The SEC is expected to decide very soon which company, previously under
investigation, against which it will pursue an enforcement action for violating FD. Recently,
PeopleSoft, Inc., and Northrup Grumman were accused of violating the rule by holding
private information sessions with analysts; both companies deny providing the analysts with
any material information. John Labate, SEC Takes Action on Disclosure Violations, FIN.
TPAns, April 8, 2002, at 30, available at 2002 WL 16946737.
71. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
72. Id.
73. Colvin, supra note 38.
74. Id.
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....
You'd think the industry would want a level playing field to
protect the integrity of the game."75 However, ironically, the
regulation has not fulfilled one of its secondary goals - to increase
the transparency of the American capital market, because the effect
of the rule still allows for information to be kept from investors
and analysts alike.
Improving the integrity of our capital markets is only a part of
the larger vision that Regulation FD represents. Propelled by a
broadening of general public access to the stock markets, the rule
embodies a democratic archetype permeating business institutions.
Traditionally a game for the wealthy, modem technology has
transformed the means of business and commerce, and therefore
the economy. Consequently, changes to the selective disclosure
system of the American stock market were apt to follow.
Regulation FD is a fundamental alteration to the market
information disclosure process, and illustrates a general shift
towards a general policy to protect the average investor. Regulation
FD was overdue, but its effects may be dampened as a result of the
travesty of the Enron collapse: Enron has propelled a slew of
disclosure reforms, and FD is not enough.
VIII.

ENRON: PUTTING INVESTORS ON THE RUN

The monumental downfall of Enron has redirected the focus of
protecting the individual investor to Americans' financial literacy. If
the American public does not know nor understand the basics of
personal finance, no Fair Disclosure regulation, nor any other for
that matter, can protect them from another Enron. A recent survey
conducted revealed "Americans scored an average of 42 percent on
a 14-question test of basic knowledge of personal finances. For
instance, two-thirds falsely believe there is 'an organization that
insures you against losing money in the stock market or as a result
of investment fraud.' "76 More shockingly, 45 percent of Americans
incorrectly believe diversification to guarantee that investments will
perform well even if the stock market does not, and 63 percent of
those surveyed do not understand the basic concept of inflation. 77
These grim statistics patently illustrate how easily information
disseminated into the market, as a result of FD, for example, can
75.

Id.

76. Besty Stark, ABC News: Economic Illiteracy? Americans Flunk Basics of Finance
(ABC television broadcast, Feb. 6, 2002) available at http://www.abcnews.com.
77. Id.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 40:695

quickly become misinformation to certain investors. For instance:
[I]n the past [analysts' conflict of interest issues as indicated
in buy/sell recommendations] didn't cause as many problems
because the community consuming that information was the
institutional-investor community ....
They understood that a
buy recommendation does not necessarily mean it is a good
buy for them. That understanding has slipped because of the
expansion of individual-investorparticipation.So a big part
of the problem and the solution goes back to investor
education. The industry and the regulators can do more to
help investors ....78
The growing number of equity analytical tools and trading systems
on the internet has impacted the market as shown by greater
trading and more available information. 79 However, the availability
of such resources does not necessarily mean that individual
investors are equipped to engage in the markets on their own.8°
Such facts beg the question: "Is it smart for the average investor to
make decisions about the market, which is influenced by many
81
other factors that [he] might not understand?"
Thus, speculation exists that Regulation FD falls short of its
desired goals. "People need, first of all, accurate figures. They need
to know what they're investing in; they need information on the
companies they're investing in. And they need to learn how to
invest their money in a wise way and diversify their portfolios."8 2
The current fair disclosure regulation requires companies to
disclose accurate financial information to analysts and investors
alike, but only when the company decides to disclose any
information at all. Moreover, if a company of Enron's size, along
with its accountants and lawyers, could conclude that the securities
3
laws allow what had occurred, the current laws are inadequate.8
78. Rolling Out a New Regulatory Environment: Industry, Government Lawyers
Discuss the Latest Trends, Corporate Legal Thmes Roundtable (Feb. 2002) (citing Nora Mead
Brownell, Commissioner of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission), available at 2/02
CORP. LEGAL TimES 62, col. I (emphasis added).
79. Personal Finance: Martini Chat, TheStreet.com, Dec. 23, 2001 (citing Lisa Meyer,
Personal Finance Editor at TheStreet.com), available at 2001 WL 32973677.
80. Id. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
81. Id.
82. CNNfn Before Hours: In Light of Enron, Need for Financial Literacy Among
Americans Comes to Forefront, Feb. 6, 2002 (quoting Don Blandin, President of American
Savings Education Council), available at 2002 WL 4333655.
83. Hendriques, supra note 3 (quoting Richard C. Breen, former SEC Chairman).
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The events of the Enron disaster violated "the spirit and intent of
securities laws and the whole concept of full and fair disclosure."8
SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt, appointed by President Bush, asserts
that Regulation FD fails its intended effect because the regulation
does not demand disclosure. 85 In essence, companies can "tell
everything to everybody, or nothing to anybody."86 Furthermore, he
indicated, assuring investors, that his priority is to enforce the
securities laws in a manner so that the events of Enron cannot
recur.87 Therefore, upon its review of Regulation FD's performance
in its first year of effectiveness, the SEC, in its report, made three
recommendations: (1) more definitively declare to issuers the
information that must be made public by providing additional
guidelines on "materiality;" (2) provide companies with incentives
for relaying information to the public by allowing more technology
to be used in the information dissemination process; and (3)
closely examine post Regulation Fl) market information and filings
for a clearer understanding of how the regulation has affected the
depth and quality of information that companies have been
8
providing. 8
Nevertheless, the question remains: Did Regulation FD fail to
prevent the Enron collapse? In other words, would the rule have
provided investors with the information necessary to foresee
Enron's downfall, and get out before so much was lost? The answer
is probably not. The scandalous cover-up practices occurring at
Enron were accounting frauds and book-cooking. The information
that was released to the public by the company's management was
inaccurate and false. Moreover, because of Regulation FD, market
analysts were not receiving guidance from the company;89 thus,
both analysts and investors were receiving the same inaccurate
information from Enron, and both analysts and investors were
mislead as to the financial health of the company. Also, for
84. Id.
85. The SEC Recommends Improvements to Regulation FD, supra note 2.
86. Pitt the Gamekeeper, THE ECONOMIST, February 16, 2002, available at 2002 WL
7245193.
87. James Toedtman, Pitt Against All Odds, NEWSDAY, Feb. 12, 2002, availableat 2002
WL 2727647. However, Regulation FD only ensures that analysts will not have an edge over
investors in receiving material information from corporate executives. Credit-rating agencies
were exempt from the regulation, and still have access to such information. Nguyen, supra
note 1. Notably, Enron collapsed because of the massive debt hidden in several partnerships.
Thus, investors and analysts alike are more closely observing the credit ratings of issuers. Id.
88. The SEC Recommends Improvements to Regulation FD, supra note 2.
89. That is exactly what Regulation Fair Disclosure sought to prevent. See supra notes
17-19 and accompanying text.
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analysts, because Enron's debt was placed in special purpose
entities' books instead of the company's books, "it was becoming
increasingly difficult to understand how Enron was achieving
revenue growth and profitability."9° FD removed from analysts their
tools for making transparent the fmancials of a very opaque
company; yet, analysts could not cease covering Enron in the
market altogether, despite not understanding it, because Enron was
an industry giant.9 However, Regulation FD probably did not
prevent analysts from discovering any information via private
guidance from the company, which would have enabled the market
to anticipate Enron's failure; the outright lies, fraud, and deception
of the management would have been told to everyone. Therefore,
Regulation FD could not have protected the public in such a
situation.
In the wake of Enron, industry leaders have spoken out for
changes in many facets of the industry - from the disclosure of
accounting practices to analysts' conflicts of interests. 92 Warren
Buffet, the famed billionaire investor, views the solution as
something a bit simpler, lying within the companies themselves. He
stated, "I would suggest that the CEO regard himself as the chief
disclosure officer of the company .... In the end it's the CEO who
determines the qualitative aspect of disclosure, and that's
90. Claire Mencke, Post-Enron Reforms Will Focus on Fuller and Faster Disclosure,
INVESTOR's Bus. DAILY, Feb. 20, 2002, at Al (quoting Chuck Hill, research director of
Thompson/First Call).
91. Id. One article discusses the implications of negative reporting about an issuer.
analysts were prevented from asking questions when participating in a conference call.
Stuart Weinburg, Pivotal Has Cut Me Off Since I Said "Sell," NAT'L POST, May 1, 2002
available at 2002 WL 19615780. But after the Enron and Merrill Lynch scandals, some
analysts may be more willing to say what they think.
92. Some problems and possible remedies:
[Olur system of financial and related disclosure is old, it's outdated, it neither provides
timely or current information, nor does it provide clear and understandable financial
disclosure ....
[Tihe three target goals of improvements in our financial reporting
process [are] the timeliness of information to the marketplace, the transparency of
that information being presented to that marketplace, and the transformation of the
process by which that information is created and communicated.
James Cheek, Partner at Bass, Berry & Sims, Roundtable Discussion on Financial Disclosure
and Auditor Oversight (Mar. 6, 2002) available at www.sec.gov/spotlight/roundtables/
accountround030602.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2002). See Scott Bernard Nelson, SEC Rolls
Out Reforms - Timetable Unveiled for Rules to Speed Disclosure of CorporateInformation,
THE BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 13, 2002, at C1. The SEC worries that extended involvement in
securities reform, for example, the New York State Attorney General's probe into analysts'
conflicts of interests, will "set a dangerous precedent and lead to a Balkanization of the
securities laws, as each state weighs in with its own mandates...." Gasparino, supra note
59, at C1.
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all-important."9 3 Furthermore, corporate executives must be willing
to respond to investor interest, and accept responsibility for their
company's disclosure practices.94 Heightened investor interest in a
company's disclosure practices is a new challenge for issuers,
because investors will no longer accept at face value the
management's portrayal of the company's financial health.9 5 The
individual investor is now more willing to dissect and interpret a
company's financial statements.96 Such a change is important
because in the end, companies must answer to their investors.
More corporations, such as Krispy Kreme Doughnuts and General
Electric, are feeling the heat of scrutiny for their own accounting
practices because of Enron.97 Additionally, more disclosure
scandals are coming to light. For example, Global Crossing Ltd., a
giant in the telecommunications industry, sought bankruptcy
protection in January 2002 after its accounting treatments for
swaps falsely inflated the company's revenue.98 Also, Adelphia
Communications Corporation recently revealed that it borrowed
$2.3 billion that was kept off its books, and the company's shares
fell in response. 99 As a result, this could be "the year of the
93. Buffett Spotlight CEOs, available at http://money.cnn.com/2002/03/04/ceos/wires/
buffettre/index.htm
94. Discussing American companies' response to cries for disclosure due to Enron,
Former SEC Commissioner Laura Unger replied:
I think right now companies are trying to make sense of what it is investors want and
what the SEC wants in terms of additional disclosure. The focus has traditionally been
on earnings. Have companies met their earnings? What were the expectations?
Managing those expectations isn't so easy anymore - post Regulation FD .... So I
think companies are trying to assess what texture they need to give. What's
meaningful to investors?
Business Center, 5:00 p.m. (CNBC television broadcast, Apr. 23, 2002).
95. Gretchen Morgenson, Wait a Second: What Devils Lurk in the Details?, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 14, 2002, at section 3-1, 11.
96. Id. Hopefully, the ordinary investor will be able to understand such documents. See
infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
97. Dan Fost, Stung by Enron, Business JournalistsIncrease Their Vigilance, THE SAN
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, March 3, 2002, available at 2002 WL 4014449.
98. Susan Pulliam and Dennis Berman, SEC Examines Andersen Work for Telecoms,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2002, at A3. Notably, both Enron and Global Crossing used the same
accounting firm, Arthur Andersen LLP Id. Furthermore, as previously discussed, analysts at
Merrill Lynch promoted struggling technology stocks, including Global Crossing, which they
did not believe in. Caroline E. Mayer and Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Rein in Analysts, Dealers
Agree; N.Y, Merrill Lynch in Talks on Reform, THE WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 13, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 19153541. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. SEC
disclosure reforms regarding analyst independence are currently underway. Pulliam and
Berman, supra note 98.
99. Geraldine Fabrikant, A Family Affair at Adelphia Rocks Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
4, 2002, available at www.nytimes.com (last visited April 10, 2002).
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footnote;" examining the fine print of a company's financial
statements could reveal possible poisons to the company's financial
health. 1°° In this respect, Regulation FD has already prompted
positive change after Enron's failure:
What's changed is that analysts are now making disclosures.
That's all you can ask. Before you had a banking relationship
or something that was a . . . nudge thing that the investor
assumed or knew and the individual was unaware of. Now this
kind of stuff is in the fine print, but it's there. Investors can
find it if they're looking for it and can make a decision with
that knowledge, which is all we're really looking for.101
Though individual investors still need to educate themselves about
the market, Regulation FD has assisted in making the desired
information more available. 0 2
[X.

CONCLUSION

Regulation FD may not survive the aftermath of Enron's collapse
because of public outcry for changes across the market. Regulation
FD bandages only a small problem in the disclosure system by
requiring material information to be conveyed to analysts and the
public at the same time. The slight progress that Regulation FD has
made can be invalidated because the rule could become obsolete
due to "real-time" disclosure. SEC Chairman Pitt has proposed to
supplement the current periodic (say, quarterly) disclosure system
with one of "continuing disclosure." 0 3 In other words, Pitt advises a
"pro-disclosure requirement," imposing an affirmative obligation on
"undeniably significant information
companies to disclose
100. Id. (quoting Rik Kirkland, managing editor of Fortune). Other regulatory changes
in the industry are bound to occur, including new accounting rules for special purpose
vehicles, whose financial statements are kept separate from the company's books. Andrew
Hill, Wall Street Opens Its Books, FiN. TiMEs, Apr. 18, 2002, available at 2002 WL 16946622.
101. Personal Finance: Martini Chat, supra note 79 (quoting Aaron Task, Senior
writer at TheStreet.com).
102. Hil, supra note 100 (stating that investors could be overwhelmed by corporate
America's new openness, and shareholders may learn more than they ever hoped or feared
to know).
103. Rolling Out a New Regulatory Environment, supra note 78 (quoting Sarah A.
Miller, Director of the Center for Securities, Trust and Investments at the American Bankers
Association). Pitt stated: "Even before the Enron situation, we were working to improve and
modernize our disclosure system - to make disclosures more meaningful, and intelligible, to
average investors." Harvey L. Pitt, How to Prevent Future Enrons, Dec. 11, 2001, availableat
www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch530.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2002).
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immediately." 1°4 Information issued periodically quickly becomes
stale, old information; continued disclosure could make Regulation
FD moot 0 5 because the simultaneous disclosure would no longer
be necessary if the public had access to a constant stream of
information.
However, Chairman Pitt disagrees with that assessment, because
selective disclosures to analysts and other market professionals
would still be prohibited. 1°6 Regardless, loopholes still exist in the
system, and Regulation FD may be just the first of many patches.
Enron has prompted a more serious look into the effectiveness
of securities regulations. However unfortunate the investor losses
in Enron, some good may result from the travesty: large
corporations will start to release more detailed information about
07
themselves in an effort to become more transparent to investors.
Such bold behavior will probably make issuers better off in the
long run. The well-intentioned Regulation FD and any other
disclosure regulation like it would not have softened the blow of
Enron's fraudulent, deceitful conduct, nor prompted further
modifications to the securities disclosure system or investigation in
to the individual investors' understanding of the financial markets.
Unfortunately, only a grave disaster like Enron is powerful enough
to compel a comprehensive reexamination of the securities system
in search of change.
Marissa P Viccaro

104. Neal Lipschutz, Fast Disclosures by Corporations Sought by SEC, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 17, 2001.
105. Rolling out a New Regulatory Environment, supra note 78. See Lipschutz, supra
note 104 (quoting SEC Commissioner Laura Unger in a report stating "eventually, Regulation
FD may become obsolete").
106. Lipschutz, supra note 104.
107. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.

